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Abstract
The use of the Internet by terrorists appears to diverge into two distinct modes neither of which is mutually
exclusive. The first aligns to the view that terrorists will use the Internet as a platform to launch cyber attacks
against critical infrastructure nodes as well as key government and private sector networks. This paper discusses
the alternate mode that being the primary use of the Internet by terrorists will be to recruit, train, communicate
and gain information about potential targets by conducting virtual reconnaissance. It will examine the nexus
between the virtual world and the physical threat that is manifested as a result of the ideology being promoted. The
requirement for law enforcement agencies to develop capabilities to track the activities of terrorists in cyberspace
presents technological and human resource challenges.. Whilst the Far Right and Islamic Fundamentalist groups
have seized upon the opportunity to network and promote their particular ideologies, they have until recently done
so in relative isolation. This scenario is now in transition as Far Right groups are providing links and information
on their websites about Islamic Fundamentalism.
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INTRODUCTION
The use of the Internet by terrorists appears to diverge into two distinct modes neither of which is mutually
exclusive. The first aligns to the view that terrorists will use the Internet as a platform to launch cyber attacks
against critical infrastructure nodes as well as key government and private sector networks. This paper discusses
the alternate mode that being the primary use of the Internet by terrorists will be to recruit, train, communicate
and gain information about potential targets by conducting virtual reconnaissance. The very success of the
Internet in facilitating these endeavours may provide some degree of protection from direct attack, however it
may still be utilised as a platform from which to carry out virtual attacks against physical infrastructure.

VIRTUAL COMMUNICATION: REAL TIME THREAT
The increasing availability of comparatively cheap, reliable and high bandwidth communications have aided the
increasing globalisation of businesses and commercial services. Many of these same inputs can be seen as aiding
the globalisation of terror networks. The trend that was clearly seen for the first time in the 1970’s when
organisations such as the Popular Front for the Liberation of Palestine (PFLP) began to use the global media
network in order to publicise their agenda has continued. In the specific case of what is known as Islamic
fundamentalist terrorism, the dispersed nature of recruiting and communications has caused a fundamental shift
in how to define and approach the threat posed by this utilisation of leadingedge communications technology.
The Metropolitan Police Service (MPS) Deputy Commissioner Peter Clarke when asked if the experience with
the Irish Republican Army (IRA) had prepared the police for the new threat posed by Islamist terrorism stated,
“What we see is global in origin, global in ambition, global in reach. The networks are loose, they are fluid and
they are incredibly resilient” (Clarke cited in The Weekend Australian 23 September 2006).
This ‘global reach’ is aided by recent advances in communications technology, which provide a medium that
allows terrorist groups and their political supporters to promote their ideology and activities on the world stage

with minimal infrastructure and costs. Digital video cameras, laptops and editing software can all be utilised to
advocate the cause of the particular terrorist group involved. It has being said that, “The media are the terrorist’s
best friend. The terrorist’s act by itself is nothing, publicity is all”, .
The availability of modern digital technologies and the ubiquity of communications channels such as the Internet
can be seen as making these groups their own media entity. They no longer need to rely on the presence of third
party media organisations to record and distribute their message, at least to a sympathetic audience.
Once the video and accompanying imagery are prepared they can then be uploaded onto the Internet and
accessed from almost anywhere, providing the contemporary terrorist with the ability to potentially influence
activities at the national and international level . This ability to deliver a different viewpoint counteracts the
framing of events by the mainstream media organisations allowing for terrorist groups to reach a global audience.
It also provides for anonymity when accessing and viewing the material for those who may share the same
ideological views as the terrorist organisation . Likeminded individuals can find each other in cyberspace via
online blogs and chatrooms. “The arrival of the Internet has provided the first forum in history for all the
disaffected to gather in one place to exchange views and reinforce prejudices”, . Against this background of
widely available communications and digital media technology it is hardly surprising that terrorist groups are
utilising it to maximum effect.

TERRORISTS ON THE INTERNET
Whilst there has being much discussion regarding the possibility of a cyber attack against critical infrastructure
nodes, it would appear that the primary uses of the internet by terrorist groups are currently, “propaganda, secure
communications, intelligence gathering, and funds management” . This stance is supported by Weimann who is
of the opinion that the Internet was used for, “coordinating attacks, and planning actions including the attacks of
September 11, 2001, as well as those of March 11, 2004, in Madrid and of July 2005 in London”.
In Australia the Commonwealth Director of Public Prosecutions (DPP) in the material facts regarding R v Lodhi
alleges that the accused used the Internet to access and download photographs of selected establishments that he
wished to attack. The Commonwealth DPP also alleges in the material facts regarding R v Khazall that the
accused in this case compiled and partly authored an electronic document titled, “Provision in the Rules of Jihad
– Short Wise Rules and Organisational Structures that Concern every Fighter and Mujahid Fighting against the
Infidels”. It is further alleged that this document was then uploaded onto a website with unrestricted access
where it remained for a period of 8 months . These cases demonstrate the use of various modern communications
technologies, most notably the Internet, as an aid to planning and intelligence gathering rather than as a mode of
attack. In this case the Internet can be seen as an enabler to assist in achieving the desired outcome.
It is also plausible that the invasion of Afghanistan and the destruction of many terrorist training camps have
forced the leaders of these groups to put material on the Internet in order to survive and maintain their ability to
instruct recruits. This has made the information more readily available to a wider audience. It has, however made
the information more vulnerable to interception by police and intelligence agencies who will study it in order to
discern the ‘modus operandi’ of the groups involved .
The Internet combines global reach with the capability to store and disseminate extremist materials. It is also a
conduit by which to instruct and indoctrinate potential members via email or provision of access to restricted
websites. Digital communications also provide opportunities for police and intelligence agencies to intercept,
track and decrypt if resources and legislation permit.

TRACKING TERRORISTS IN CYBERSPACE
The manner in which terrorist cells communicate, distribute propaganda and training materials and other
pertinent information via the Internet makes it difficult for state and nation based law enforcement agencies to
track and curtail their activities. The ability to log on anonymously in Internet cafes around the globe makes it
problematic for conventional law enforcement strategies to be effective. In place of a centralised command and
control structure, there exists a flatter more diversified loose cluster of senior cells offering spiritual and

operational guidance via the Web .
This diversified structure provides for ‘tactical independence’ whilst ensuring that the individual cells still
adhere to an overarching strategic effort. This view is supported by Whine who also identifies the resilient
nature of such a structure due to the increased stability provided by, “geographical dispersion both physical and
in cyberspace” .
Terrorist cells are communicating covertly via the Internet thereby minimising discernable links to known parent
terrorist organisations. Many of those involved will not even have travelled to countries of interest to participate
in training. This presents a challenge to law enforcement and intelligence agencies as to how they identify these
cells prior to an event occurring. “The radicalisation process is occurring more quickly, more widely, and more
anonymously in the Internet age” .
The openness of the Internet presents challenges for police and intelligence agencies to track seemingly
innocuous message traffic between cell members, unless they have already being identified as being of interest.
The nature of the challenge posed by attempting to track down and identify ‘amorphous’ terrorist networks can
be resource intensive . However, whilst Clarke & Newman advocate that these resources may be better utilised in
preventative actions they acknowledge the use of the Internet by terrorist groups for recruitment and the
transmission of messages from charismatic leaders.
According to Melman the following communication was the last message sent by Mohammed Atta, to the other
members of the 9/11 terrorist cell, “we’ve obtained 19 confirmations for studies in the faculty of law, the faculty
of urban planning, the faculty of fine arts, and the faculty of engineering”.
This message would clearly have not triggered any warnings on monitoring or ‘sniffing’ technologies hardwired
into Internet Service Providers like the FBI’s Carnivore system otherwise known as ‘DCS100’ . The message
referred to the targets to be attacked by the hijacked aircraft as well as the number of terrorists who would be
taking part. Some Internet messages or strategic documents compiled by known terrorist entities can provide
insight into future activities. These are the documents, which need to be identified and analysed as a priority.
Once such document was posted online in December 2003 and identified by Brynjar Lia from the Norwegian
Defence Research Establishment (FFI). His view was that the document was of strategic value to the ongoing
insurgency in Iraq and it was only reviewed after the March 11, 2004 attacks in Madrid . The FFI analysis of the
document clearly identifies economic cost as a key weakness in the sustainability of the U.S. led operation in
Iraq. Should coalition partners be forced to withdraw from Iraq, then the U.S. could not fund the operation either
economically or politically on its own. Spain was discerned as the most vulnerable because of the public
opposition to the war, which could prove pivotal if harnessed .
In addition to using the Internet for coordination and exchange of information prior to an attack, terrorists can
also conduct research on potential targets and obtain detailed photos and plans electronically, thereby minimising
the actual time they are exposing themselves during a physical reconnaissance of a target . The recent attacks on
mass transit systems have highlighted the volume of publicly available information regarding schedules, routes
and timetable changes that is available for download from various government and private web sites. This can be
combined with imagery from sites like ‘Google Earth’ when planning a terrorist attack as it provides additional
detail about the potential target and its surroundings.

GLOBAL IDEOLOGY – LOCAL INTERPRETATION
The nature of the personnel who may become involved in Islamic terrorism is changing. The source of recruits
now extends from not only those who have fought in traditional Jihad overseas, in conflicts like Bosnia,
Chechnya and Afghanistan but also encompasses those who are second and third generation born in countries not
directly involved in such conflicts and who may never have travelled outside their country of birth. These home
grown extremists know little of the homeland of their parents or grandparents, yet they feel aggrieved by the
foreign policies of their country of birth or by the perceived injustice being experienced by groups overseas .

This emotional attachment to a group with whom they share little in common other than a religious belief is
being fed by images of Jihad warriors fighting in conflicts in places like Afghanistan and Iraq. The importance
of propaganda is clearly understood by terrorist groups who video their attacks and then upload them onto the
Internet for editing and hosting by various websites. These videos serve as a powerful tool for recruitment . In
addition to being shown on the Internet the videos cause controversy when they are shown on mainstream
western media like CNN (CNN, 2006).
In a speech at Queen Mary’s College in London on the 9 th of November 2006 the Director General of the UK
Security Service better known as MI5 spoke of the ideology developed and marketed by groups like AlQaida via
the Internet which links the approach taken by Western countries to regional issues in the Muslim world. This
can be interpreted by extremists, “as evidence of an acrosstheboard determination to undermine and humiliate
Islam worldwide” .
Dame ManninghamBuller also highlighted the difficulties facing the Security Service and police given the
sheer numbers involved and volume of information requiring analysis. Figures provided included in excess of
1600 individuals who formed part of 200 known networks. Some of these individuals were undergoing
radicalisation, “through chat rooms and websites on the Internet” .
Therefore the possibility exists for an individual or group to become completely radicalised via the Internet
thereby remaining virtually unknown to police and intelligence agencies. This can be achieved through virtual
training camps like, “Al Qaeda’s Al Battar Training Camp” .
A recently declassified report from the Canadian Security Intelligence Service (CSIS), details the threat posed by
Islamic extremists of Canadian birth and nationality due to their ability to avoid detection as they appear no
different to any other Canadian citizen. Islamist groups recognise the value of genuine travel documents and the
potential to access countries with strict boarder controls they represent .
This trend has also being identified by the Dutch Intelligence Service (AVID). Terrorist activity by nationals was
graphically demonstrated by the suicide bombings in London in which those involved were able to become
radicalised whilst outwardly maintaining the veneer of being part of the UK culture.
Recent arrests in Australia as a result of Operation Pendennis demonstrate the wide spread nature of the threat of
‘home grown’ extremism for many nations This threat has been recognised by the Australian Government, “the
terrorist threat to Australia does not only come from external sources. It can also come from people living and
working in Australia” .
The lessons learnt from the London bombings on July 7 th 2005 clearly show that the timeframe in which to
identify a person in the process of becoming radicalised is extremely short . Potential terrorists in this country
may be second or third generation Australians, and may not have travelled to countries of interest or conducted
themselves in such a manner as to draw attention from the Australian Security Intelligence Organisation (ASIO),
or other national agencies like the Australian Federal Police (AFP). “It is terrorism of a previously unknown
scale. It is a different kind of conflict, perpetrated in the name of a Muslim extremist cause. We must understand
it if we are to defeat it” .

CHALLENGING THE MAINSTREAM WESTERN MEDIA
Islamist groups target particular nationalities in order to obtain the necessary media coverage to potentially
generate community demands for change to a nation’s foreign or domestic policy. One such incident was the
attack on the rail infrastructure at peak hour in Madrid just prior to the last Spanish general elections. The
resultant loss of office by the reigning political party and the subsequent withdrawal of Spanish troops from Iraq
could be interpreted as a significant victory for the Islamists and a vindication for their use of force to achieve a
political objective .
A prime example of a media organisation that is highly supportive of terrorist acts is the AlManar Satellite
Television network. This network shows the understanding that groups like Hezbollah regarding the impact and

reach of mass media. The ability for subscribers across the globe to access the network provides a medium,
which can be used to communicate and influence a wide audience. The potential exists for some subscribers to
use this as a primary source of news and information, instead of commercial networks in countries where they
now reside. This could influence their judgement on key issues and alter their opinions regarding foreign policies
of the governments in their new homes. It can also limit assimilation and lead to a sense of self imposed
isolation, from the remainder of the community.
Clearly, the challenge is how to present an alternative viewpoint. The U.S. has invested heavily into an its own
Arabic language satellite network, which is not being well received by its intended audience in the Middle East
who have clearly recognised it as a propaganda tool . It is however a step in the right direction and acknowledges
the need to communicate a different viewpoint in a foreign language, to an audience who if receptive could alter
the perception of the U.S. in that region.
Traditional values and outlooks are undergoing change in most Australian communities regardless of their
ethnicity or geographical location. Drug use is penetrating all levels of social, economic and ethnic strata and its
effects are challenging the traditional authority of community leaders and policing agencies. There clearly exists
the potential for homogenous groups to withdraw from active participation in the wider Australian community,
this could leave them highly susceptible to influences from sources like AlManar.
The linkage between AlManar and Hizballah is such that cameramen are often in position to get footage that no
other new agency has access to. This level of cooperation clearly indicates a high degree of trust with the
inference that AlManar journalists and camera crews may have prior knowledge of Hizballa and Palestinian
operations .
The ability to disseminate material favourable for their cause has enhanced Hizballa’s standing and esteem in the
Arab world. The medium by which to exert influence is normally accompanied by the responsibility that it
entails. These guiding ethics of journalism have led to it being cited as the fourth estate where truth and integrity
in reporting pertinent and newsworthy information are seen as key principles. AlManar has by definition always
admitted its journalistic bias in reporting and it was one of the first Arabic media outlets to perpetrate the
conspiracy theory regarding the events on 9/11 . This has resulted in many in the Arab world believing that the
attacks were carried out by Mossad with some U.S. assistance thereby removing any sympathy that would be
normally generated by such a large loss of civilian life.
However, one program regularly broadcast on AlManar presents a chilling insight into the mindset of a suicide
bomber when his family stated, “our youths do not dream of luxury and comfort; they dream of life after death” .
In Tunis, 2005 key industry and government leaders met at the, World Summit on the Information Society
(WSIS). One of the keynote speakers at the event was Israeli Foreign Minister Silvan Shalom who on 16
November delivered an address clearly identifying the dangers posed by Hamas and its use of the Internet stating
that it, “is one of the most active terrorist groups on the Net. It runs no less than eight Internet sites in seven
languages” .
One way in which governments have reacted to the identified threat posed by ALManar is to legislate and
prevent its provider service from broadcasting it in their respective countries. However the current broadcast
technology makes it difficult to actually achieve this without the cooperation of the service provider. In France
this was achieved by political pressure on Eutelsat, which is a French owned company that was carrying the Al
Manar signal. However, Nilesat, which is Egyptian owned and Arabsat, which is Saudi, owned, are still capable
of broadcasting to an audience in France .
Whilst not in the same ideological frame as AlManar the Doha based Arabic news network AlJazeera has
frequently being the first media organization to air controversial videos from conflicts in places like Iraq. Whilst
the ability of this network to reach Arabic speaking viewers globally is understood there is some debate
regarding its new English language news channel and the manner in which it will frame issues like “terrorism
and resistance”, (http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/middle_east/6105952.stm). This is pertinent when consideration is
given to the dramatic expansion in viewer audience that is likely.

TERRORIST WEB SITES
Whine identifies two extremist groups as being pivotal in the use of the Internet by terrorists these being the
Islamic Extremists and members of the Far Right or White Supremacist Movement. Whilst the Islamists seek a
return to the Caliphate, the Far Right seek a utopia where they can live untroubled by other races, politicians or
the rule of law . Given the very nature of the ideology of these groups it is of concern that they appear to be
forming virtual alliances against what they perceive as a common enemy, even if it is an alliance of convenience.
This common enemy is seen as the state of Israel and the disproportionate influence on global activities they
perceive exerted by members of the Jewish faith .
One of the better known Far Right websites is ‘Aryan Nations’ . On this site are links to Mujahideen and Islam,
which take the enquirer to forums regarding Islamic related topics posted next to Nazi SS symbols. Another Far
Right site is Stormfront ‘White Pride World Wide’ and whilst this site as yet has no links to Islamic websites it
shares many of the characteristics of other extremist sites. These include multimedia, ideology, training, physical
fitness and merchandise to promote the group.
The Islamist websites act as a conduit for information to those who are ideologically close but geographically
distant. These sites provide material with a narrow puritanical interpretation of Islam from well known extremist
authors, thereby creating the opportunity for someone to become ‘virtually radicalised’ without ever having
contact with a member of a terrorist group in person. These sites are also useful in recruiting new members . The
former leader of the Finsbury Park Mosque Abu Hamza used to promote his sermons and worldview by
recording them on cassette tapes for sale across the UK . Amongst those attracted to Hamza’s particular
interpretation of Islam were university educated young men who understood the potential of the Internet. They
began converting the sermons and writings of Hamza into digital format and uploaded them onto various
websites where they freely accessible to anyone. Since the arrest of Hamza on terrorism related offences in the
UK some of these sites have being shut down and others continue to relocate .

CONCLUSION
The phrase, “the Internet interprets censorship as damage and routes around it” is attributed to John Gilmore one
of the cofounders of the Electronic Frontier Foundation . It clearly identifies the potential challenges of
attempting to prevent the use of cyberspace by terrorist entities. Whilst there are technical means to attack such
websites the legal challenges posed by the transnational nature of these activities place them beyond the
legislative capabilities of nation states . Clearly more work is required at the international level to enact
legislation that can successfully meet the challenges posed, by the exploitation of the Internet by terrorist
entities. There needs to be an enforceable legal framework that limits the illegal activities conducted in
cyberspace. The challenge here is to ensure cooperation between the governments and law enforcement agencies
of those nation states involved. Existing information sharing infrastructure and procedures could be enhanced so
organisations like INTERPOL can take a lead role in prosecuting offenders regardless of where they reside.
It is not only police and intelligence agencies that are seeking to learn from the Internet, the terrorists are also
watching and learning. They review failed operations to see what prompted intervention by the police, they also
look at material presented in open court which reveals capabilities and they also examine media reports
particularly those that might include leaks regarding sensitive investigations .
It is intriguing that terrorist groups with such a puritanical worldview would avail themselves of one of the
freedoms to which they are so vehemently opposed, when communicating or spreading their ideology . The use
of the Internet by terrorists will need to be continually monitored and the material they circulate examined in an
effort to both understand their motivations and prevent further attacks.
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